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Abstract Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority
monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states
that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that
Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an
alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a
principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well.
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Priority monism is the thesis, defended by Schaffer in a series of articles
(2007, 2010a, b, 2013), that the cosmos is a fundamental whole, and that all
subcosmic objects depend on it.1 Steinberg has shown that, given certain
assumptions, it follows from priority monism that no whole depends on its proper
parts. This consequence is highly implausible,2 hence the argument seems to qualify
as a reductio ad absurdum of priority monism. Steinberg’s argument relies on three
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1 Actually, Schaffer has often stated priority monism in terms of grounding, adopting the concept of
grounding as primitive and without clarifying its relationship with the akin concept of ontological
dependence. I agree with Steinberg that Schaffer’s terminology is misleading, because usually grounding
is categorially restricted to facts (Steinberg 2015, p. 2027). For this reason, I will phrase the discussion in
terms of dependence.
2 Indeed, Schaffer himself claims that priority monism is compatible with the view that some subcosmic
composites depend on their proper parts, though being ultimately dependent on the whole cosmos
(Schaffer 2010a, p. 44).
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main assumptions: the first assumption is Necessity of Monism, namely the claim
that, if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. The second assumption is
what Steinberg calls Internality of Dependence: for any objects x and y, if x depends
on y in some possible world, then x depends on y in every possible world where both
x and y exist. The third assumption is a principle of Isolation: for any composite
x which exists at the actual world, there is a possible world where the only objects
which exist are x and its parts. The argument is the following:
Assume that (A) priority monism is true and suppose for reductio that
(S) some composite c depends on one of its proper parts p. By Isolation, there
is a world w that includes only c and its parts, among them p. By Internality of
Dependence, since c and p exist at w, c depends on p at w. By (A) and
Necessity of Monism, at w, the cosmos is the one and only basic concrete
object. Since, at w, c = the cosmos, c does not depend on anything concrete at
w, in particular not on p. Contradiction! We may thus deny our supposition
(S) and discharge our assumption (A): if priority monism is true, no composite
depends on any of its parts. (2015, p. 2026)
Steinberg convincingly argues that there is no reasonable way to deny Isolation or
Internality of Dependence (2015, pp. 2027f.). The remaining option to elude this
argument would be to reject Necessity of Monism, but Steinberg also argues that
this move is not viable (2015, pp. 2026f.), since Schaffer himself endorses that
principle (2010a, p. 56) and employs it to support priority monism.
In this paper, I will argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up
Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I will call Essentiality of
Fundamentality: necessarily, for every cosmos c, if c is fundamental then c is
essentially fundamental. I will show that this principle, if properly worked out, is
preferable to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as well, so replacing Necessity
of Monism with it would not be an ad hoc move. Finally, I will argue that the cost of
this move for Schaffer’s argumentative strategy is smaller than Steinberg suggests,
and ultimately worth paying. At the end of the day, friends of priority monism have
good reasons to give up Necessity of Monism for Essentiality of Fundamentality.
In order to state Essentiality of Fundamentality and contrast it with Necessity of
Monism, one needs to clarify the relationships between the concept of cosmos and
that of possible world. I define a cosmos as a causally isolated system, i.e. a system
which cannot interact with any system mereologically disjoint from it. Putting aside
the complex issues about the ontological status of possible worlds, a possible world
can be roughly defined as a complete possible state of reality3: with this in mind, a
cosmos is just one of the objects which exist at a possible world, though an object of
a peculiar sort. Like subcosmic objects, cosmoi exist at many possible worlds, and
are subject to transworld identity and distinctness: there are possible worlds w and
w’, with a cosmos c existing at w and a cosmos c’ existing at w’, such that c = c’.
Particularly, there are possible worlds where there are cosmoi distinct from this
3 Incidentally, this sounds like an ontologically neutral version of Plantinga’s definition of a possible
world as a maximal consistent state of affairs (Plantinga 1974).
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cosmos, the one we are part of. According to the present definition of ‘‘cosmos’’,
there are also possible worlds where many cosmoi exist, since it is possible that
there are many causally isolated systems.4 On the other hand, in the empty possible
world, i.e. the possible world where no object exists, there is no cosmos at all. We
know that in the actual world there is at least one cosmos, namely the cosmos we are
part of, but that there are other cosmoi too is an epistemic possibility we should stay
agnostic about.5
A cosmos is fundamental iff (i) it does not depend on any object, and (ii) it is
prior to all its proper parts or, to put it in a different way, all its proper parts depend
on it. A cosmos is pluralistic iff it is not fundamental. Priority monism, in its
minimal formulation, is the claim that this cosmos is fundamental. Within the
present framework, Necessity of Monism can be restated as the claim that, in every
possible world w, every cosmos (which exists at w) is fundamental at w. Essentiality
of Fundamentality is to be formulated in the following way: for every possible
world w, for every cosmos c, if c is fundamental at w then c is fundamental in all the
possible worlds where it exists. Differently from Necessity of Monism, Essentiality
of Fundamentality does not rule out that in some possible worlds there is a
pluralistic cosmos: the conjunction of priority monism together with Essentiality of
Fundamentality only entails that this cosmos is essentially fundamental, i.e. is
fundamental in all the possible worlds where it exists.
What is the support for this view? A motivation for Essentiality of Fundamen-
tality can be worked out by embracing the claim, defended by Bigelow et al. (1992),
that the cosmos belongs to a certain natural kind which is essential to it.6 Let us
formulate this view in terms of possible worlds: in every possible world, every
cosmos belongs to a natural kind which is essential to it. The natural kind a cosmos
belongs to is, arguably, defined by certain natural properties instantiated by that
cosmos as a whole and by a related set of laws of nature: cosmic properties and laws
are not independent, but come together, since a cosmos displays its properties by
developing according to certain laws. With this in mind, it is reasonable to include
4 It is worth noticing that Schaffer actually defines the cosmos without invoking any causal notion, as that
object of which all actual objects are part (Schaffer 2010a, p. 33), which implies that there is exactly one
cosmos. Nevertheless, I consider the present definition in terms of causal isolation to be superior. First, it
is closer to the traditional connotation of the term, which conveys the idea of an ordered and unified
whole (and actually comes from the Ancient Greek word ‘‘jo´qlo1’’, which is usually translated by
‘‘order’’ or ‘‘harmony’’). Therefore, causal unity and isolation should be included in the very definition of
the term. Furthermore, Schaffer strongly relies on modern physics and cosmology to defend priority
monism, and scientific cosmology treats the cosmos mainly as an integrated causal system. In conclusion,
my definition is closer to the spirit of priority monism than the definition employed by Schaffer himself.
5 Actually, whether there are or not cosmoi other than this one is an empirically undecidable matter,
because according to the present definition another cosmos would be causally isolated from the one we
inhabit, but any observation requires an appropriate causal connection between the observer and the
observed. It is also worth noticing that, under the present definition of ‘‘cosmos’’, the physical system that
theoretical physicists call multiverse would still be one cosmos, not a collection of many cosmoi, since its
branches are supposed to be causally related: if the multiverse hypothesis was shown to be true, that
would not count as a scenario in which we discover that there are many cosmoi, but as a scenario in which
we discover that this cosmos has a certain kind of physical structure.
6 Bigelow, Ellis and Lierse actually use the word ‘‘world’’, by which they intuitively refer to the sort of
system that I call ‘‘cosmos’’.
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in the inventory of essential features of a cosmos its structure too, intended as the
priority hierarchy which obtains between its (proper or improper) parts: whether
certain parts of a cosmos are prior to its other parts or dependent on them is an
essential feature of that cosmos. To say it with a slogan, a cosmos where
dependence works in a different way is another cosmos. This move is by no means
artificial: actually, it is suggested by the very argumentative strategy employed by
Schaffer to support priority monism. For instance, his argument from quantum
mechanics rests on the premise that the cosmos is an entangled system: that the
cosmos is an entangled system entails that the cosmos is fundamental, since an
entangled system is prior to its proper parts (Schaffer 2010a, pp. 52ff.). Within the
view I am outlining, being an entangled system is an obvious candidate as an
essential property of this cosmos, and the properties entailed by an essential
property are essential too: in this case, if a cosmos is essentially an entangled
system, then it is essentially fundamental. In conclusion, it seems that the natural
properties of a cosmos, the laws according to which it develops over time and its
structure form an organic package deal: properties and laws necessarily come
together, and entail a certain kind of priority hierarchy. Once that structure has been
rightfully included among the essential features of a cosmos, Essentiality of
Fundamentality follows: if a cosmos is fundamental, then it is essentially so.
Essentiality of Fundamentality can be seen as a replacement for Necessity of
Monism since it preserves Schaffer’s intuition that priority monism is somehow a
metaphysical law, because it is concerned with the essential structure of the cosmos,
not with its accidental features. With this in mind, I claim that Essentiality of
Fundamentality is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism, since it avoids the
arbitrary restrictions of the space of metaphysical possibilities imposed by the latter:
after all, what is absurd about a pluralistic cosmos? Even if this cosmos is
essentially fundamental, the possibility of a cosmos of a different kind with a
pluralistic structure still seems warranted. Schaffer has defended Necessity of
Monism by embracing loose slogans, like the claim that ‘‘… metaphysical
possibilities hold fixed how grounding works’’ (Schaffer 2010a, p. 63), or the claim
that priority monism is a metaphysical law, and metaphysical laws ‘‘… govern what
grounds what’’ (Schaffer 2010a, p. 56). To be sure, there is some necessary, analytic
truth about dependence, like the principles of irreflexivity, asymmetry, and
transitivity, and maybe there is also some synthetic principle, like that of well-
foundedness, which states that endless dependence chains are impossible (Schaffer
2010a, pp. 37, 62). That said, there is no reason why a certain priority hierarchy
should obtain in all possible worlds, no matter which kinds of objects exist.
Essentiality of Fundamentality has the advantage of avoiding such arbitrary
restrictions of the space of metaphysical possibilities.
Given the distinction above between cosmoi and possible worlds, Steinberg’s
application of Isolation and Internality of Dependence is still straightforward: a
composite a which is subcosmic at the actual world, is a cosmos at some possible
worlds, since in a possible world where only a and its parts exist a is ipso facto
causally isolated. If in the actual world a depends on its proper parts, then in those
possible worlds where a is a cosmos, a is a pluralistic cosmos. Nevertheless, once
Necessity of Monism has been abandoned for Essentiality of Fundamentality
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Steinberg’s reductio fails in its original form. On the other hand, it cannot be
reconstructed by appealing to Essentiality of Fundamentality, because of the modal
differences between a cosmos and its denizens. The quickest way to see that is to
invoke the principle of necessity of distinctness (Kripke 1980, p. 114): for any x and
y, if x and y are numerically distinct, then it is impossible that x is identical to y, i.e.
there is no possible world where x is identical to y.7 This cosmos and a denizen of it
are numerically distinct, so it is impossible that they are identical: given a
subcosmic object a, it is possible that a is a cosmos, but it is not possible that a is
identical to this cosmos. Therefore, the actual cosmos being essentially fundamental
(which follows from the conjunction of priority monism and Essentiality of
Fundamentality) and the possibility of an actual subcosmic composite a being a
pluralistic cosmos do not entail the possibility of a being a fundamental cosmos, so
they do not contradict Internality of Dependence. The reductio is eluded.
That said, the necessity of identity and the necessity of distinctness are not
uncontroversial, so it is worth stressing that there are also other modal differences
between a cosmos and its denizens which make Essentiality of Fundamentality
unsuited for Steinberg’s reductio. Every subcosmic composite is either an integrated
whole or a mere aggregate. Integrated wholes like living organisms essentially
belong to a certain natural kind, which is different from that of the cosmos they
inhabit: for instance, Socrates is essentially a human being, whereas the cosmos is
not. It is possible that Socrates is a cosmos,8 but not that he is identical to this
cosmos. Therefore, the possibility of Socrates being a cosmos does not contradict
Internality of Dependence. One can make analogous considerations in the case of
mere aggregates, like a heap of sand: a heap is, arguably, mereologically fragile,
because it has its parts essentially. On the other hand, this cosmos is mereologically
flexible, since it might be composed of subcosmic objects other than those it is
actually composed of. Again, even if it is possible that a heap is a cosmos, it is not
possible that it is identical to this cosmos. In any case, priority monism, Essentiality
of Fundamentality and the possibility of an actual subcosmic composite being a
cosmos do not entail that there are possible worlds which contradict Internality of
Dependence.
Steinberg might reply, as an ad hominem point, that eluding his objection by
replacing Necessity of Monism with Essentiality of Fundamentality is a Pyrrhic
victory, because Necessity of Monism is required to build Schaffer’s arguments for
priority monism: indeed, Steinberg suggests en passant that ‘‘… at the very least,
the priority monist would lose significant argumentative ground by giving up
Necessity of Monism’’ (2015, p. 2027). Actually, only two of Schaffer’s arguments,
namely the argument from the possibility of gunk and the argument from the
possibility emergence, rely on what I will briefly call Modal Exclusiveness: either
7 In a footnote, Kripke shows that the necessity of distinctness can be proven in a way analogous to that
of the necessity of identity: ‘‘Suppose X = Y; if X and Y were both identical to some object Z in another
possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence X = Y’’ (Kripke 1980, p. 114).
8 Actually, Steinberg acknowledges that Isolation might be false for living organisms (2015, p. 2028),
since it conflicts with Kripke’s thesis of the necessity of origin (Kripke 1980, pp. 112f.). However, here I
am granting this point at least for the sake of argument.
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priority monism is necessarily true, or pluralism is necessarily true (Schaffer 2010a,
p. 56).9 Necessity of Monism follows logically from Modal Exclusiveness: thus, the
rejection of the former entails the rejection of the latter. I will show that the
argument from the possibility of gunk can be vindicated even without that principle.
On the other hand, the argument from the possibility of emergence cannot be
vindicated, but this represents a negligible loss.
In Schaffer’s formulation, the argument from the possibility of gunk assumes the
metaphysical possibility of gunk: the existence of portions of atomless matter is at
least metaphysically possible. Schaffer argues that pluralists can accommodate this
metaphysical possibility in three ways: (1) accepting that an endless dependence
chain is possible, (2) maintaining that the basic objects are some subcosmic
composites, or (3) granting that pluralism is false at gunky possible worlds. (1) is
incompatible with the principle of well-foundedness, (2) is arbitrary, and (3) is
incompatible with Modal Exclusiveness. Therefore, pluralism is false, and, by
Modal Exclusiveness, priority monism is (necessarily) true (Schaffer 2010a,
pp. 61ff.). Once Necessity of Monism and, together with it, Modal Exclusiveness,
has been rejected, the argument from the possibility of gunk fails, as long as it relies
on the metaphysical possibility of gunk. Nonetheless, it can be reformulated as an
argument from the epistemic possibility of gunk. As far as we know, this cosmos
may be (entirely or partly) gunky: Schaffer himself stresses that there are ‘‘…
scientifically serious, empirically open hypotheses…’’ which posit an endless
descent toward lower and lower levels (Schaffer 2010a, p. 62), like the infinite
regression of sub-electron particles hypothesized by Dehmelt (1989), or the infinite
quantum fields regression hypothesized by Georgi (1989). Pluralists can accom-
modate such eventualities only by endorsing one of the options (1) and (2) above,
but those are troublesome. Therefore, pluralism seems to rule out gunk hypotheses,
imposing an armchair, a priori constraint on an open empirical question, whereas
priority monism does not. In this respect, the latter has an advantage over the
former, since it is not threatened by the eventuality of ‘‘bad news’’ from physics.10
This version of the argument, differently from Schaffer’s, does not need to assume
Modal Exclusiveness or Necessity of Monism.
The argument from the possibility of emergence starts from the assumption that it
is metaphysically possible that the cosmos has emergent properties. But a cosmos
which has emergent properties is prior to its proper parts. Therefore, it is possible
that the cosmos is fundamental. This conclusion, together with Modal Exclusive-
ness, entails that this cosmos is fundamental (Schaffer 2010a, pp. 55f.). Within the
present framework, the main premise of the argument has to be reformulated as the
9 Schaffer claims that ‘‘Either it is metaphysically necessary for the cosmos to be a fundamental whole,
or it is metaphysically necessary for the cosmos (if it has proper parts) to be derivative’’ (Schaffer 2010a,
p. 56): the parenthetical condition is required to exclude cases like that of a cosmos composed of exactly
one elementary particle.
10 Of course, there is a sense in which even priority monism is threatened by the eventuality of ‘‘bad
news’’ from physics: if those gunky hypotheses were conclusively refuted, even the argument from the
epistemic possibility of gunk would be undermined. However, that would not show that priority monism
is false, whereas the confirmation of those hypotheses would show that pluralism is false. The asymmetry
is still in favour of priority monism over pluralism.
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claim that in some possible world there is a cosmos which has emergent properties,
which seems a plausible assumption. But that is not sufficient to warrant that this
cosmos could have emergent properties even if, as a matter of fact, has none, since it
does not entail that there is a possible holistic cosmos which is identical to this
cosmos. Actually, according to the view that I have outlined, a cosmos with no
emergent property has such a character essentially. Therefore, there is no way to
conclude that this cosmos is essentially fundamental from the mere possibility of
cosmic emergence.
It seems that the argument from the possibility of emergence cannot be
vindicated within the present framework. However, this argument plays a minor role
in the overall strategy of Schaffer, who observes that such an argument ‘‘… lurks
behind…’’ the argument from quantum mechanics (Schaffer 2010a, p. 55): once we
know empirically that this cosmos, being an entangled system, has emergent
properties, we do not need to invoke a priori the mere possibility of cosmic
emergence anymore.
In conclusion, defenders of priority monism should be happy with giving up
Necessity of Monism for Essentiality of Fundamentality, which offers significant
gains at a small cost. The conjunction of priority monism and Essentiality of
Fundamentality eludes Steinberg’s objection and, once worked out by endorsing the
Bigelow–Ellis–Lierse view of the cosmos as one of a kind, provides us with a theory
which preserves the spirit of Necessity of Monism without imposing any arbitrary
restriction on the space of metaphysical possibilities. On the other hand, most of
Schaffer’s arguments for priority monism, namely the argument from parsimony
(Schaffer 2007), the argument from quantum mechanics (Schaffer 2010a), the
argument from internal relatedness (Schaffer 2010b), and the argument from
fundamental laws (Schaffer 2013), stand unaffected by this move, whereas the
argument from the metaphysical possibility of gunk can be reshaped as an argument
from the epistemic possibility of gunk. The only price to pay is to accept that the
resulting version of priority monism is not supported by the argument from the
possibility of emergence anymore, but we have seen that this is a negligible cost: all
things considered, defenders of priority monism should pay it to buy the advantages
offered by the replacement of Necessity of Monism with Essentiality of
Fundamentality.
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